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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
ware corporation laws take heed of its burdens. To base limitations
on power of amendment on the latter principle would be to penalize
stockholders for the sins of the corporation, for the average in-




Our courts have shown no inclination to depart from the rules
laid down by the cases which are generally recognized as authority
in this country. Statutes have played little or no part in the
development of this topic in West Virginia, and it is probable that
a consultation of the leading texts' will give as accurate a picture
of the future position of the court as any case study. The chief
difficulty lies in the fact that the subject of stockholder's suits,
while very important, is not a very controversial one, and where
the authorities split we are as likely to follow one side as the other,
and it is not easy to make a prediction in these cases on the basis
of a general attitude or trend.
There are about a dozen leading cases in this state, a study of
which will perhaps help to clarify the general outlines of the sub-
ject, and to determine our court's probable approach to any new
problem in it.
1. Who May Sue. If the suit involves dissolution of the cor-
poration not less than one-fifth in interest of the stockholders must
sue under our statute,2 but a receiver may be appointed for suf-
ficient cause at the suit of any stockholder. In general it seems
I' FLTnER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE Ls w OP PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (Rev. ed.
1931) ; THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS (3rd ed. 1927); COOK, CoRPRokIoNs (8th
ed. 1923). These texts are cited in almost all the West Virginia cases on stock-
holder's suits.
2 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 31, art. 1, § 81. The court has been rather
striet in requiring good cause to be shown for the application of this statute.
Ward v. Hotel Randolph Co., 65 W. Va. 721, 63 S. E. 613 (1908); Robinson
v. Weimer-Warren Co., 110 W. Va. 143, 157 S. E. 85 (1931); Law v. Rich,
47 W. Va. 634, 35 S. E. 858 (1900). See also Kyle v. Wagner, 45 W. Va. 349,
32 S. E. 213 (1898).
. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 31, art. 1, § 82. See also on the appointment
of receivers for corporations, id. c. 56, art. 6, 99 1, 2.
4 Maxon's Adm'x v. Maxon-Miller Co., 53 W. Va. 150, 44 S. E. 131 (1903),;
Tierney v. United Pocahontas Coal Co., 85 W. Va. 545, 102 S. E. 249 (1920) ;
Campbell v. King's Daughter General Hospital, 96 W. Va. 539, 123 S. E. 396
(1924). 13 FLEzcEma, CORPORATIONS § 5975. But see 6 THOMPS N, CORPORA-
TioNS § 4576.
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that any stockholder may bring a derivative suit, irrespective of
the size of his holdings.4 An equitable owner of stock may sue.5
2. Who Must Be Parties. Since the corporation has a legal
interest in the subject matter of the suit, which will be adjudicated,
it is a necessary party to the suit, and failure to join it is a ground
for demurrer.' However, the corporation is not an indispensable
party, and where it is insolvent and has de facto ceased to exist, or
is disabled to act by the misconduct of its agents, or in the case of
some other fact rendering the interest of the corporation formal
only, failure to join it will be excused.7  Of course, all those who
would normally be necessary parties to an equity suit involving
the same subject matter must be joined.8
3. Prerequisites to Starting the Suit. It is apparent that suit
by one who has no title himself to the claim sued on, is a type of
extraordinary relief, permitted only in a narrow category of cases.
In this light the many conditions precedent to the exercise of this
remedy are natural restrictions.
In order to bring this type of suit there must be a cause of
action belonging to the corporation, which it refuses to exercise,
and which refusal causes injury to the plaintiff as a stockholder.
The suit must of course be in equity, even though the corporate
right of action is a legal one, since the plaintiff does not have legal
title to it.'
Before a stockholder may maintain this suit he must allege
and prove notice to the directors of the corporation, demand upon
them to exercise the corporate right of action, and refusal by them
to do so, and similar demand, notice and refusal as to the stock-
holders. This notice is not necessary where the directors, or the
controlling stockholders, are so connected with the wrong that the
affairs of the corporation cannot safely be left in their hands. Such
5 Felsenheld v. Bloch Bros. Tobacco Co., 192 S. E. 545 (W. Va. 1937); 13
'LFTCHER, CORPORATIONS § 5976.6 Nimick v. Mingo Iron Works, 25 W. Va. 184 (1884); Crumlish's Adm'r
v. Shenandoah Valley R. R., 28 W. Va. 623 (1886); 13 FLETCHER, CORPoRA-
TIONS § 5997; 6 THoMxPSO, CORPORATIONS § 4650.
7 Steenrod v. W. P. & B. R. R., 27 W. Va. 1 (1885); Crumlish's Adm'r v.
Shenandoah Valley R. R., 28 W. Va. 623 (1886); Kyle v. Wagner, 45 W. Va.
349, 32 S. E. 213 (1898); 13 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS § 5997. But see 6
THOmPSON, CORPORATIONS § 4650 contra, citing Mount v. Radford Trust Co.,
93 Va. 427, 25 S. E. 244 (1896).
8 13 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS H 5996-6002; 6 THOmPSON, CORPORATIONS
§§ 4649-4955; Upton v. Southern Produce Co., 133 S. E. 576 (Va. 1926).
9 Moore, Pres. v. Schoppert, 22 V. Va. 282 (1883); Rathbono v. Gas Co.,
31 W. Va. 798, 8 S. E. 570 (1888); 13 FLETCHR, CORPORATIONS §§ 5945-5956.
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excuse must appear clearly before the court will act, and it seems
that a safe practice would be to give notice anyway.10
4. Bars to the Suit. Many authorities require that the plain-
tiff be free from any complicity in the wrong sued on, and that he
be a stockholder at the time of such wrong, or a purchaser from
one who was an innocent holder at that time. There are several
possible rules on this point, varying considerably in strictnesq.11
No West Virginia cases were found on the point. It is submitted
that the suit would probably be allowed here, if the plaintiff were
himself innocent of any connection with the wrong.
Laches is another possible bar, but it has been held that the
Statute of Limitations does not apply, even by analogy, although
a legal claim is sued on, and that laches must be shown after the
plaintiff knew all the facts, was in a position to act, and should
reasonably have done so. The doctrine of laches will not usually
be applied unless some of the parties have died, the rights of third
parties have intervened, or loss of evidence has resulted from the
plaintiff's delay.12  If the corporation would have been barred,
there is a complete bar to the suit.
5. Grou-nds for the Suit. According to definition and author-
ity this suit may be used to enforce any right of action of the
corporation when it refuses to do so. But, practically, almost all
cases involve a wrong to the corporation by officers, directors, or
stockholders; otherwise the corporation would probably exercise
its rights. In most cases, then, the grounds will be misconduct of
directors or stockholders, not falling under the categories of non-
reviewable directorate or stockholder action. In cases of directorate
misconduct, any action involving misappropriation of funds and
dissipation of capital will usually suffice.1 3  In case of wrongful
10 No appeal is necessary where the corporation is entirely in the control of
the wrongdoers. Moore v. Lewisburg & R. E. R. R., 80 W. Va. 653, 93 S. E.
762 (1917); Rathbone v. Gas Co.; Moore, Pres. v. Schoppert, both supra n. 9;
Crumlish's Adm'r v. Shenandoah Valley R. R., 28 W. Va. 623 (1886); Smiley
v. New River Co., 72 W. Va. 221, 77 S. E. 976 (1912) ; Ward v. Hotel Ran-
dolph Co., 65 W. Va. 721, 63 S. E. 613 (1908); Deveny v. Hart Coal Co., 63
W. Va. 650, 60 S. E. 789 (1908).
1113 FLCrHER, CORPORATIONS §§ 5978-5984; (1908) 21 HARv. L. REV. 195.
12 Tierney v. United Pocahontas Coal Co., 85 W. Va. 545, 102 S. E. 249
(1920); Crammer v. McSwords, 24 W. Va. 595 (1883); Felsenheld v. Bloch
Bros. Tobacco Co., 192 S. E. 545 (W. Va. 1937).
13 Hope v. Valley City Salt Co., 25 W. Va. 789 (1885); Tierney v. United
Pocahontas Coal Co., 85 W. Va. 545, 102 S. E. 249 (1920); Lamb v. Cecil,
25 W. Va. 288 (1884), reversed 28 W. Va. 653 (1886); Crumlish's Adm'r
v. Shenandoah Valley R. R., 28 W. Va. 623 (1886); Ravenswood, S. & G. R.
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acts of stockholders, there must be a case of fraud, misconduct
amounting to fraud, insolvency of the corporation, or complete
or substantial cessation of corporate activity.
14
The mere fact of dealings between the corporation on one side,
and a director or stockholder on the other, will not constitute a
right of action,15 althought the directors are held to be fiduciaries
of the corporation.'
A recent West Virginia case17 raises several of these problems
and discusses them at length, giving a valuable guide to our court's
present position. In that case a large block of stock was held by
three trustees under a will. A cestui que trust and one trustee
sue the other two trustees as trustees and as directors of the cor-
poration, for mismanagement of the trust, and as minority stock-
holders in a derivative suit. This comment deals only with the
second theory of the suit.
The court held in an opinion by Judge Maxwell that the plain-
tiffs could maintain the suit on the ground of mismanagement of
the corporation which materially reduced the assets thereof. 8
R. v. Woodyard, 46 W. Va. 558, 33 S. E. 285 (1899). Many of these cases
involve the payment of unauthorized compensation to officers or directors.
Some of them rely on a West Virginia statute [W. VA. ANN. CODs (Barnes,
1923) e. 53, § 531 forbidding unauthorized compensation of the president in
the section providing for the office. This provision does not seem to have been
included in W. VA. REv. CODE (1931), although e. 31, art. 1, § 18 purports to
cover it. Maxon's Admix v. Maxon-Miller Co., 53 W. Va. 150, 44 S. E. 131
(1903) ; Goodin v. Dixie-Portland Cement Co., 79 AV. Va. 83, 90 S. E. 544
(1916); Campbell v. King's Daughter General Hospital, 96 W. Va. 539, 123
S. E. 396 (1924). But see Watts v. W. Va. Southern R. R., 48 W. Va. 262,
37 S. E. 700 (1900). See also 5 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS §§ 2109-2153.
14 Smiley v. New River Co., 72 IV. Va. 221, 77 S. E. 976 (1912) ; Ward v.
Hotel Randolph Co., 65 W. Va. 721, 63 S. E. 613 (1908).
15 Watts v. W. Va. Southern R. R., 48 W. Va. 262, 37 S. E. 700 (1900);
Felsenheld v. Bloch Bros. Tobacco Co., 192 S. E. 545 (W. Va. 1937).
16 Hope v. Valley City Salt Co., 25 W. Va. 789 (1885); Young v. Columbia
Oil Co., 110 W. Va. 364, 158 S. E. 678 (1930). This case has been cariticized
for going too far in holding the directors trustees for the corporation. Note
(1932) 38 W. VA. L. Q. 158. But it will be seen that this is the language used
by other courts (3 FLETCHER, CoRPOR.TIONS §§ 838-860) and that the applica-
tion of the rule by our court does not work any hardship. See also State ex rel.
Blackwood v. Brast, 98 W. Va. 596, 127 S. E. 507 (1925).
17 Felsenheld v. Bloch Bros. Tobacco Co., 192 S. E. 545 (W. Va. 1937).
'i There was a provision in the will limiting the control of the trust to one
of the defendants for life, but it was held that he had by his misconduct taken
the case out of the terms of the will. This point weakens the case as authority
for the proposition that an equitable owner may bring a stockholder's suit.
However, it is still a definite holding. The courts says (p. 547), "The doors
of equity will not be closed to a cestui que trust merely because his interest in
the corporation . . . . is less direct than that of a legal stockholder ....
Many cases confirm the right of cestuis que trustent to vindicate their rights in
equity."
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The three grounds of the suit were (1) loans to dominating
directors; (2) acquisition of stock by dominating directors under
an employee's stock subscription plan, and (3) excessive and
gratuitous salaries paid to officers and directors of the corporation.
As to the loans, it was held that the action would not lie, in
the absence of allegations to show fraud, or disadvantage to the
corporation resulting from them, since loans to directors are not
inherently wrong.19
The acquisition of stock under the employee's subscription
plan provided a ground for a stockholder's suit, since it was a clear
abuse of the plan, and amounted to misappropriation of funds, the
purpose of the plan being to stimulate interest among employees
in the corporation and its affairs, and therefore providing for is-
suance of the stock at very advantageous terms.
The excessive or gratuitous salaries paid to officers of the
corporation constituted a ground for this type of suit if they were
not previously authorized or agreed upon by the stockholders, but
not otherwise. If such salaries were improperly paid, it amounted
to a breach of the fiduciary duty of the directors to the corpora-
tion.
20
It was also held that neither the Statute of Limitations nor the
doctrine of laches applied, although some of the acts occurred as
much as twenty-three years prior to the commencement of the
suit, since the relation of trust and confidence existing between the
defendants and the corporation made the affair one of which equity
takes cognizance, and made applicable different rules as to the
diligence which must be exercised in prosecuting the suit.
21
The attitude of the West Virginia court on this subject, in so
far as it has departed at all from the orthodox view, has been a
realistic one, rather than consistently strict or liberal. The remedy
is severely limited to start with, but where the restrictions tend to
become mere formalities, they are immediately relaxed. The
directors are held to be fiduciaries, but where they have business
dealings with the corporation, they are upheld if they are actually
fair, and there is no discrimination against a director beyond what
19 See cases cited supra n. 15.
20 See discussion of this point supra n. 13.
21 See cases cited supra n. 12.
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is necessary for the corporate welfare. Our hardest problem, then.
since our court is in substantial accord with the majority rule on
all these points, is to discover exactly what that rule is, since it
often appears that there are two equally strong rules on a point.2 2
C. A. P., JR.
DISJUNCTIVE ALLEGATIONS IN INDICTIVIENTS
AND VARIANCE BETWEEN ALLEGATIONS
AND PROOF
The Constitution of West Virginia, following in substance the
provision of the Constitution of the United States' and the consti-
tutions of the several states, guarantees that in trials of crimes and
misdemeanors ".. . . the accused shall be fully and plainly in-
formed of the character and cause of the accusation ... ."2 The
reasons generally given for this provision are that the accused is
entitled to know with certainty what offense is charged so that he
may prepare an adequate defense and not be taken by surprise by
evidence offered at the trial, and that he is entitled to have the
offense so charged that upon acquittal or conviction he may plead
the same in bar of a subsequent proceeding for the same offense
and establish his plea by production of the former record. This
note will touch, in this connection, on disjunctive allegations in
indictments and variance between allegations and proof.
Under such guaranty, most courts hold, and our court has
held,4 that an indictment ' which charges an offense, using the
22 The recent United States Supreme Court case of Ashwander v. Tennessee
Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 56 S. Ct. 466 (1936) raises a question as to
whether the court will follow Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U. S. 331, 15 L. ed. 401
(1866) (a stockholder's suit lies to force the corporation to resist payment
of any illegal tax, however slight in its effect), or Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.
S. 450, 26 L. ed. 827 (1881) (the exercise of sound business policy by the
directors may not be complained of in a stockholder's suit, whether they have
failed to enforce all corporate rights or not). It is probable that the West
Virginia court, pursuing a realistic policy, would follow Hawes v. Oakland,
which states a sound rule for the general welfare of the corporation. It has
been cited with approval in several West Virginia cases. [Rathbone v. Gas
Co., 31 W. Va. 798, 8 S. E. 570 (1888).]
'U. S. CoNsr. Amend. VI.
2 W. VA. CoNsT. art. III, § 14.
3 Berger' v. United States, 295 U. S. 78, 55 S. Ct. 629 (1935); Clifford v.
State, 29 Wis. 327 (1871).
4 State v. Charlton, 11 W. Va. 332, 27 Am. Rep. 603 (1877) ; State v. Miller,
68 W. Va. 38, 69 S. E. 365 (1910); State v. Dawson, 184 S. E. 253 (W. Va.
1936), the latter case holding that the full information must be in the indict-
ment, and that what the accused may draw from adventitious circumstances
does not count.
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